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CHAPTER 3
THE ANALYTIC

ON
CONTINENTAL DIVIDE
PHILOSOPHY

IN

NIETZSCHE'S LYING TRUTH,
HEIDEGGER'S SPEAKING LANGUAGE,
AND PHILOSOPHY

Babette E. Babicb

I

t is the difference in the reply that can be made to the question,
'What is philosophy?' that constitutes the difference-and the
divide - between analytic and Continental styles of thinking. For ana
lytic purposes, philosophy may be defined, as Michael Dummett
defines it in the Origin.! o/Ana/ytie Philwophy, in terms ofUthe belief. first,
that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philo
sophical account of language. and, secondly. that a comprehensive
account can only be so attained."l Like Dummett. Martin Heidegger
100 will define philosophy in terms of thought and of language.
although conceiving both conceptions as intrinsically elusive rather
than clearly available. In What!,) Cd/ed Thinkljlg, Heidegger reflects on
the nature of thinking but declares, and repeatedly declares: "/f/o,!!
!holl.qht-pmvokillg i. that we are ,1/il/ not thinking." And, as Heidegger
admits. the claim that we are "still not thinking" seems annoyingly erro
neous: "How dare anyone assert today that we are still not thinking,
today when there is everywhere a lively and constantly more audible
interest in philosophy, when almost everybody claims to know what
philosophy is all about!"2 For Heidegger, just as for Dummett. philos
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ophy is a matter of thinking; the difference is that for Heidegger. as also
for Nietzsche. one cannot simply give an account of thinking: not only
must we ask what thinking is, we have first to learn to think. which ~or
Heidegger means we have to learn to listen, and he will even claim,
learn to learn-and to let learn. 3 In reference to language too. Hei
degger is careful to remind us of the inherent ambiguity of what "plays
with our speech"s as language does: "We are moving on shifting
ground, or, still better. on the billowing waters of an ocean" (p. 192).
"Words," for Heidegger, "are not terms, and thus are not like buckets
and kegs from which we scoop a content that is not there. Words are
wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again. that easily
cave in. but that at times also well up when least expected" (p. 130).
Thus Heidegger can explain that "Thinking clears its way only by its
own questioning advance. But this clearing of the way is curious. The
way that is cleared does not remain behind, but is built into the next
step. and is projected forward from it" (p. 172). Where Dummett
advances propositions, Heidegger questions the logic of propositions
and raises the question of what is called thinking as what withdraws,
shifts, what wells up. Where Dummett can distinguish what belongs to
the analytic nature of philosophy, Heidegger speaks of what differenti
ates thinking from what ordinarily passes for philosophy to remind us
in a book addressed to the nature of thought itself that we are "still" not
thinking. Evidently, there is a stylistic and indeed temperamental dif
ference between the two approaches to the doing of philosophy even as
an explication of the subject matter of philosophy. Temperament and
style, however. do not exhaust the distinction to be made between ana
lytic and Continental approaches to philosophy, for the distinction con
stitutes a divide: the parties in question are opposed one to another.
What makes (and breaks) Continental philosophy is its open
embrace of philosophic questioning as questioning. This openness to
sustained inquiry opposes "analyzing" (dissolving/resolving or elimi
nating/denying as unreal or as P.Je'lld"-problems) the perennially
intractable questions of the philosophical tradition. Analytic philos
ophy, by contrast. features "a deflationary conception of philosophy
a conception according to which philosophical problems are pseudo
problems, problems to be dissolved not solved,"o as John Skorupski
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describes it in his contribution to a very slim volume entitled The Ri.'e of
Al1a{vtic Philodophy. The antithesis of such a smoothly, calculatedly
understated attitude, Continental philosophy tends to intensil}r philo
sophic problems with its approach (resulting from Heidegger's passion
for what he calls "thinking" as well as the kind of bombastic style one
finds in Nietzsche or, latterly, Baudrillard.)
A consideration of the role of the philosophy of science (as con
ceived within these two traditions) highlights the methodological and
stylistic distinction between the "deHationary" philosophic project of
analytic philosophy and the convicted enthusiasm of Continental phi
losophy. To review this (supertIcially merely) temperamental distinc
tion between analytic and Continental philosophy, it is important to
note the role of science. Without specifically adverting to the influence
of science on contemporary thought, analytic philosophy can be expli
cated just as Dummett explicates it above: as a matter of clariJYing one's
thinking and as thought is defined by language, analytic philosophy
thus reduces to the analysis of language. What this definition omits,
particularly as one encounters it in Dummett's defining discussion, is
that the question of the cognitive referent is not to be decided by log
ical analysis but contemporary \Vestern science. (And the timeliness of
science's authority is important to emphasize for it excludes, say, out
of-date sciences such as those derived from the doctrine of signatures
[homeopathy] or astrology [as Feyerabend teased], in addition to non
Western sciences like Ayurvedic medicine or acupuncture.) In this way,
analytic philosophy stands to science as scholastic philosophy once did
to theology.
Continental philosophy differs from analytic philosophy in its
openness to questioning, which also means that it is less concerned with
solutions than it is with critical questioning (including the question of
its own presumptions or prejudices). But this focus on critical ques
tioning also means, at least ideally, that Continental philosophy does
not aspire to take its rational warrant from science itself as anai.'vtic phi
losophy does do.l In this way, l'2dmund Husserl famously challenges
scientific reason for the sake of the ideal of "scientific" or objective phi
losophy in his Cr/:II:'. and Heidegger notoriously observes that "science
does not think. "8 and Friedrich Nietzsche bluntly overreaches his hand

66

A

HOUSE DIVIDED

Babich: On the Analytic-Continental Divi

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

-_._---"-,-"-,_._..._-_._-_._---,--"" ..__._._----->_.---,._.,,'----_.,,-,,-,,-,--,----

as he identifies a particular brand of methodological "stupidity" as a
prime characteristic of modern science. 9 Intriguingly, albeit counterin
tuitively enough, Continental (rather than analytic) philosophy is thus
positioned both critically and philosophically to raise the question of
the nature of scientific inquiry.lo
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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: REGARDING A
"DEFLATIONARY" APPROACH TO
PHILOSOPHY
The story of the analytic mode of philosophy is currently being told by
analysts from Michael Dummett and L. Jonathan Cohen to Ronald
Giere and Alan Richardson to the more recent efforts of Michael
Friedman. II In the Anglo-American context,12 what is called analytic
philosophy grew out of the so-called language philosophy that aspired to
match the logically empiricist claims of the Vienna Circle (and its brand
of logical positivism). It was this tradition, very much in the person of
Rudolf Carnap and other refugees from fascism,13 that came to be
poised against the vagaries (and the vagueness, especially the vague
ness) of the historical tradition of philosophy and all it was associated
with, notably Nietzsche and Heidegger, but it would also include Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty and would eventually be deployed against Husserl
who-given the commonalities between Husserl's and Frege's language
or given Husserl's epistemologically quite respectable interests-would
have placed himself more in line with Frege than with Heidegger. The
distinction would turn out to be ensured by the fortunes of world his
tory following the end of the Second World War and determined by
analytic philosophy's subsequent accession to power as the putatively
neo-Kantian program of deliberately redrawing philosophy in the image
of science, or at least in the image of logical analysis.
Problems of philosophy would henceforth be resolved by linguistic
clarification and logical analysis. In other words, to use Skorupski's
analytic contention: they would be "deflated" or unmasked as pseudo
problems. Any other philosophical approach would be misguided or
erroneous, and in the light of the fortunes of the academy leading to the
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institutional dominion of analytic philosophy: simply a bad way to do
philosophy. Consequently enough, today's philosophic establishment
prefers to refuse the distinction between philosophical kinds. 14 Accord
ingly and from an analytic perspective, it is routine to argue that there
is no such thing as a merely, sheerly stylistic divide between analytic
and Continental philosophy. Instead, and again, one has only good and
bad ways of doing philosophy. GiJiJd philosophy is well vvritten, well
formed and formulaic -or clearly argued and hence easy to understand
(this ease of understanding counts for as much in the academy as it does
on Madison Avenue and television programming), and that is, of
course, a matter of clarity and of arguments, judged as such and artic
ulated from an analytic viewpoint-which is also to say, with the late
Quine and Davidson-from a logical point of view. Bad philosophy is
thus anything that is not all that (i.e., every bit of what is counted as
"good" philosophy) especially if it is reputed to be hard to read or
understand. This is philosophy defined, as Nietzsche could have said it,
for bad teeth.
What can be overlooked in this championing of clarity and sim
plicity is that the analytic tradition itself was institutionalized rather
than vigorously argued into place. It was not a triumph of clarity which
gained it the professional dominance it currently enjoys. Rather than
the elegantly evolutionary culmination of philosophy as a kind of
Copernican (or Galilean) revolution, analytic philosophy is a revolution
of the ordinally Kuhnian kind: an exactly tactical program. Tracing the
history of logical analysis shows this program in greater detail. 's In any
case, and as some analysts might themselves concede, it was not inher
ently "clearer" to proceed as David Lewis or J.M.E. McTaggart would
do rather than, say, to undertake to clarify ideology in terms of the
Enlightenment project of reason in the manner of Adorno and
Horkeimer, etc. l6
The descriptive name of 'analytic' philosophy refers to language
and to thought, the practical or evaluative assessment of arguments (as
better and worse) -and hence it is a matter of truth and of approaching
truth. This focus, as already noted, analytic philosophy shares with sci
ence. But the prime unifier between analytic philosophy and science is
logic, and in the case of language, the deployment of logic corresponds
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to a matter of formal clarity. The upshot of this formal idea has proven
to be earth- (or at least tradition-) shattering: Eliminate ambiguity, and
past problems in philosophy are revealed as so many bogus or "pseudo
problems."I; This leads to the almost unavoidable conclusion that with
regard to what was once called philo.Jophia perel1l1U, analytic philosophy
works by breaking down or literally dissolving the entire tradition of
philosophy. And, following the model of science and at least seemingly
following Kant's demand to set philosophy on the path of a science,
analytic philosophy could at the very least promise to make headway in
philosophy-as opposed to the traditional review of always the same
set of problems with which philosophy had started.
In his careful precisions of the necessary extension of analytic phi
losophy beyond definitions that can be grounded in language-or in
logic - L. Jonathan Cohen has recourse to what he calls "seman tic
ascent" (and semantic descent, as default). To do this, one needs to
move, to use the language of the observation-correspondence rules
theory schema, from the word to the thing-especially hermeneutically
ticklish when the "thing" is not an empirical object but a concept, con
vention, or use. Cohen characterizes the same aggressive trope of ana
lytic philosophy in clearer terms than Skorupski's more quotable
"deflationary approach," and in the process Cohen tracks this aggres
sion back to its origins in the conflicts of the Vienna Circle itself.
... within the Vienna Circle, charges of meaninglessness were quite
common in informal discussion, especially in the mouths of Schlick,
Carnap and \Vaismann. It was not just that, by virtue of an argument
about how meanings are taught, positivistic doctrines were ascribed a
secure foundation in linguistic fact and metaphysical doctrines were
rejected as nonsense because empirically unveritiable. Even posi
tivistic colleagues could be accused of uttering meaningless sentences
by a philosopher who was sufficiently convinced that his own views
were the correct ones. After all, if you believe. as Ayer did, that all
important philosophical propositions are analytic truths and that ana
lytic truths are linguistic tautologies. then you must hold that any
denial of your own philosophical thesis is a kind of nonsense. like
something that is logically self-contradictory. IS
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For Cohen. and recalling the mathematical structure or essence of any
axiomatic system, this kind of contentiousness could not be seriously
maintained just because the thing about logic, as Carnap and Schlick
could not but concede. was that there could be (and there are) more
than one kind of logical system (or scheme). The compelling quality of
this concession was the nod it gave to mathematics. including both set
theory and geometry with its alternative metrics. 19

PROGRAMATIC INTERLUDE
To explore the analytic side of the analytic-Continental divide, what fol
lows offers a quasi-parodic challenge to the methodological program of
anal)'tic philosophy in a series of twenty-two paragraphs.2o This (only
in part) tongue-in-cheek provocation both reviews the historical for
tunes of analytic philosophy and offers an object (or postmodern) illus
tration of the urgency of a critique of analytic philosophy by showing
its inherent and hence incorrigible deficiencies as limitations operating
both on the terms of Continental philosophy and on those of analytic
philosophy itself (the analytic program has been consummately suc
cessful, which is why it is the dominant program and why it is redun
dant).
Following this moderately polemical exposition (for and in spite of
the formative happenstance that the present author reads Nietzsche and
hence knows what strong philosophical polemic can be, she hopes the
reader will find a restrained voice throughout the helpfully numbered
paragraphs contra analysis below). analytic philosophy's recurrent claim
of a self-overcoming-which is offered less in terms of self-criticism than
as an automatic affair of innate all-inclusiveness or comprehensiveness:
analytic philosophy as a/rea(y ContinentaL as a/reaty having done all the
groundwork for an appropriation of Continental thought. etc.-will be
examined in greater detail.
T address the nature of the differences inevitably to be found
between analytic and Continental styles of philosophizing and discuss
the matter not of a resolution of these differences but the question of
the annexation of the philosophical themes of Continental philosophy
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on the part of analytic philosophy-an annexation which, exactly
because it is not dialogical or hermeneutical, ablates the distinction
between styles altogether. And, finally and very briefly, I attempt to
look at philosophy (as such) from a questioning or Continental per
spective.

TWENTY~TWO

PARAGRAPHS AGAINST

ANALYSIS
I. The project of analytic style philosophy, whether the analytic
frame be that of ordinary language or logic, is clarity. By clarity is
meant clarity of expression. For Ludwig Wittgenstein, who coined the
effective Lei1m{)t~l of analytic style philosophy in his Tracftllil.J, "every
thing that can be put into words can be put clearly."21 Thus, philosophy,
"the critique of language,"22 is "the logical clarification of thoughts."
This clarity may be attained by definition (or fiat), but a clearly
expressed proposition is, even if a statement of a problem, surely less
mysterious than an unclear statement of the same perplexity. And just
as the Greek origins of the word afuzly,1lJ can suggest and recalling Sko
rupski's "deflationary" impetus, the point here is to reduce or dissolve
philosophical problems.
1.1. Beyond an idealized articulative clarity, analytic style philos
ophy enjoys the streamlining images of two additional regulative ideals:
intersubjectivity and verification. Intersubjectivity eliminates mysticism,
esotericism, and private languages and inaugurates (as a solipsism writ
as it were upon the world) the analytic problem of "other minds." And
by the simple expedient of bringing the "charwoman" or the "man in the
street" -however quaint. however rhetorical in intent and practice
into the hallowed circle of Robert Boyle's gentlemen observers and the
noble assurance of objectivity, the intersubjective emphasis leads not to
a circularity among elite subjects, but ordinary language philosophy
instead.
1.2. For the second regulative ideal, as the question of the intersec
tion between word and object, verification is an epistemological issue.
an ontological question, and for analysts, a metaphysical quagmire. The
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statement, "The meaning of a proposition is its method of verification"
leads in its Tarskian formation to nothing else again but the ideal of
clarity. \Vith a thus impoverished empirical ideal of presumedly
unproblematic reference (observation "sentences") there are proposi
tional objects in the world of the analyst but only patterns or atoms of
experience: pink patches-or pink ice cubes, a once-outre Sellarsism
or gruesome impressions.
2. The analytic ideal of the clarification of meaning is not only or
ultimately a matter of the clarification of terms. Rather what is wanted
is the reduction of problems, their revelation as pseudoproblems (non
problems). All problems that cannot be clearly stated are problematic
statements. 23 Hence all problems that can be counted as such are ana
lytic and hence lysible.
3. The success of analytic philosophy is intrinsically destructive. By
definition, the philosophic project itself is repudiated in its ambitions,
reduced to trivialities, and thereby overcome. This is why Wittgen
stein's ideal involves disposing of the ladder (of analytic method) after
reaching the heights of clarity.
4. By success is meant nothing more than the application or
employment of analytic philosophy in practice. This is the triumph of
use.
5. This is not true of all philosophic ventures (despite the Hegelian
[both Hegel and the nco-Hegelian] inclination to assert the contrary).
Hence the success of the Heideggerian project of the destruction of
metaphysics does not equal or reduce to the destruction of Heidegger's
project nor of metaphysics as such. Nor indeed does the success of the
more notorious and more likely instance of deconstruction conduce to
its own end. To the contrary.
6. At issue in the anaJ.y1:ic project is the end of philosophy - taken
in decidedly nonstructuralist guise. For analytic philosophy, all of meta
physics 24 together with the traditional problems of philosophy, is, as an
accomplished and desired deed (Phi1(I,I(lphia perenlliJ cl1l~/illlJitur), already
at an end and by definition (as meaningless or nonverifiable). \Vhat
remains or is left over is to be resolved by analysis. Since traditional
philosophy is set aside along with its perennial questions-these are
philosophical questions disqualified as such because of their resistance
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to analysis/resolution -an end is also made of the tradition of philos
ophy. In the place of the tradition we find science. Science, for its part,
is an empirical enterprise, but devoted to clarity and committed to
intersubjectivity (coherence or making sense) and the logical problem
of verification appears to be the principle or fundamental concern of
logical analysis or (analytic) philosophy of science. Hence the received
view in the philosophy of science is developed in the analysis of theo
ries in the hypothetico-deductive program. 25
7. Science is a suitable subject for analysis proximally because it is
itself a body (theoretically expressed) of clearly stated propositions or
claims that describe for language users (intersubjectivity), the structure
of the world and are either true or false in that connection (verifIa
bility). Science itself, it is said, is empirical analysis, a prime example of
the productivity of analysis. Circularities would seem to abound here,
as cannot be helped when tautology is one's stock in trade, but if they
are not aHirmed as they are in hermeneutic "circles," they nonetheless
provide the advantage of certainty. As Philipp Frank. one of the
founding members of the Vienna Circle, expressed the former virtue of
scientific analyticity in a statement combining the insights of Mach with
the Kantian conventions of Duhem, "the principles of pure science, of
which the most important is the law of causality, are certain because
they are only disguised definitions."26
8. Empirical observation and experiment together with logical
analysis is canonically held to decide the value of a claim or theory.
Thus analytic philosophy of science has essentially been conducted
within the spirit of the Vienna Circle. Despite Mach's "physicalism."
the members of the Vienna Circle, in the words of one commentator.
"wrote as though they believed science to be essentially a linguistic phe
nomenon. "27 This predilection for "language." be it ordinary or logical.
together with a naive view of direct observation (i.e .• observation sen
tences) means that the analytic concern of the philosophy of science has
been restricted to the analysis of theory. in a word. the received view or
hypotheticodeductive nomological ideal of science (theory).
8.1. Analytic statements are by defInition tautologous and assert
nothing about the world. This is their virtue and at the same time. this
is their impotence. Empirical statements are what is wanted in science.
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physiological elements-dramatizes a rupture between language and
world (the limits of language) which, as the essence of tautology or log
ical linguistic self-reference. is not problematic when what is analyzed
is language use, the game, or its rules, but only when what is analyzed
are empirical matters.
10. The sociohistorical turn in the philosophy of science, identified
with, among others. the otherwise analytically sensitive Hanson, Kuhn,
and Feyerabend. together with (and this is what must be seen to be
decisive) the so-called strong program of the sociology of science (not
knowledge) has yet to be accommodated in the philosophy of science.
It is this that constitutes its continuing crisis. This crisis corresponds to
its philosophical failure, a philosophical failure tied to the fundamental
schizophrenia of its analytic origins. Despite a fascination with lan
guage, and thereby, in a kind of return of scholastic nominalism, with
certainty and the idea of eliminating philosophical problems by the
expedient of linguistic or logical clarification. a positive empirical ref
erence remains relevant to science. This reference to empirical matters
in the relevance of scientific practice is what analytic philosophers of
science mean by naturalism.
11. Naturalism, which for Tom Sorell is itself a form of scientism,28
is not philosophically distinguishable from the normative or analytic
issues of verification or legitimation. The ultimate reference of the phi
losophy of science remains "natural" or actual science. As Rom Harre
observes, as plainly as any analyst could wish, "the philosophy of science
must be related to what scientists actually do, and how they actually
think."29 The imperative to express such a relation to actual scientific
practice derives not from ascendent realism but rather from the socio
historical turn that comes after the linguistic turn.
12. The sociohistorical turn seems unrelated to the analytic or lin
guistic turn. Yet the conviction held by philosophers of science from
Carnap to Hempel to Suppe and beyond, that science is a formal, log
ical, or linguistic affair was not the result of a devotion to logic as such.
Empiricism or positivism as it was understood by Auguste Comte-the
first "positivist" -embraced a positive reference to facts. Thus Hacking
recalls Comte's 'positivity' as "ways to have a positive truth value, to be
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up for grabs as true or false. "30 The ultimate appeal of Wittgenstein's
logical program of linguistic therapy (analytic clarity), combined with
Mach's physical critical-empiricism for the members of the Vienna
Circle was in the celebration of and application to practical. actual sci
ence. Only in the era of the triumph of scientific reason would such an
analytic program work as successfully and despite patent internal con
tradictions as long as it has without drawing undue attention to those
same contradictions.
13. For even if the project of analytic philosophy had been shown
to be bankrupt from a realist or empiricist or naturalist point of view,
as long as science is associated with reason, and reason or rationality is
equivalent to logical analysis, it will be analytic style which gives the
imprimatur to proper philosophical approaches to the philosophy of
science, no matter the actual success of analysis in offering an account
or philosophy of science. For this reason, Rudolf Haller points out, talk
of verification-an analytic specialty-works as a Popperian "llqlliZ
forti:1 for separating good and bad talk in science and philosophy. "31
Analytic talk remains the dominant strategy of legitimacy and distinc
tion in the demand for clarity and coherence. And it is fundamentally
Hawed, not just for the tastes of those who are not convinced of the
salutary or edifYing values of clarity and coherence, but according to its
own rationalistic terms as well. For there is no obvious connection
between deductive (or inductive or abductive) logic (or grammar or
language) and the world. Assuming without the metaphysical faith of a
Mach or the teasing leap of a Feyerabend such an elemental or obvious
connection as axiomatic or given, the analyst ends up so preoccupied
with refining his or her logical tools that he or she forgets having
renounced contact with the world.
14. The history of scientific theory and experiment, popularly
known as the"scientific revolution," is not the project of pure theory or
metaphysical speculation. Instead, it is physical or "'physicalist." It is the
history of factual observation (controlled experiment) and theoretical
explanation. For analysts, the former are to be expressed as empirical
statements and, with the verification of such observations, converted
into so-called protocol statements to which experimental or theoretical
conclusions reduce now as theory with full-Hedged propositional con
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tent. This is the ideal analytic recipe that guarantees scientific control
(progress). This same program frees humanity from its (self- or deity
imposed) bonds of superstition and inhibition.
15. Yet it is just as clear from the reference to observation and expe
rience that the history of experiment is also the history of power,
manipulation, illusion. The project of experimental progress is, in short,
that of the history of technology.
16. Separating the theoretical ideal of Newton's hypotheJi1lwll/illgo
from Boyle's celebration of neutral and observationally objective (sub
jectively independent or intersubjective) experiment is the tacit and
practical role of evidence. This introduces the realist question of what
evidence? evincing what? and the naturalist's but still more relevant
sociologist's question of evidence obtained by and for whom? The issue
of evidence is to be contrasted with theoretical truth. The last remains
a matter of configured, what Nietzsche would name j'·I1.qirte,
hypotheses.
17. More than a conceptual net, one has an array of hypotheses and
praxes, so that the infamous impotence of the e,xperimmtllm erileil to
decisively refute a scientific hypothesis or theory blinds one to the
already given and far more pernicious matter of focal, selective choice.
A given conceptual net is woven out of if not whatever we please surely
what we happen to have on hand. Moreover, there is no way to
imagine, beyond Duhem-Quine, as Davidson points out in his essay
"On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," that this or any other con
ceptual scheme represents the way things are (or are not).32 What once
represented a psychological strategy, (proto-Peircean) quiescence of
belief, atara.l"ia, or calming, Stoic equipollence, is today a feature of
crisis. \Vhat works as therapy in one context is, as the ancient Greeks
knew perhaps best of all, death in another.
18. More devastating than Duhem's instrumental critique of the use
of experiment is that which follows from Mach's EmpiriOA:l'itici,mU4 and,
in his view-a perspective shared by Polanyi, Hanson, and Fleck, and
historically articulated by Kuhn-the ideal of a quasi-artistic invoca
tion of research style and experimental tactic or technique or knack in
the life of the researcher (also to be heard in Mach's conviction that
experimental practice could not be taught-just as artistic talent is not
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communicated by instruction). The notion of scientific schools, "invis
ible colleges," Denkk(lllektiven, knowledge communities, and so on, offer
particular inspiration for sociological studies and observations. 33 The
question of what. in Harre's words, "scientists actually do" remains the
ultimate issue in a scientific era. It is this and the tracking of the ques
tion as a matter of a research discipline-not among philosophers. ana
lytically or otherwise inclined. but scientists. albeit scientists of a social
kind pursuing a discipline focused upon scientists themselves-which
may be said to have added a kind of last straw to the woes of analytic
philosophy.
19. Ultimately. the method of analysis is philosophically and scien
tifically impotent. Analysis has as it goes along, and this by its own
rights. "less and less of what to analyze."34 Note that reduction as such
(the disgregational, dissolving. when not always dissolute gesture
implied in the idea of analysis) was not opposed by Mach, who was,
with Richard Avenarius, an enthusiast of the ideal of a scheme he imag
ined reHected in nature itself. But in spite of this latter realist (and here:
metaphysical) resonance, Mach's ideal of Denkiikonomie preserved its
methodic function; it was a tactical, heuristic ideal, not an analytic end
that simply reduced a problem to its linguistic, logical components and
left it at that as if solved, whereupon one could, as it were, throwaway
the ladder. For Mach, everything could be reduced if one could assume,
as he did and the Vienna Circle did not, that everything was convertibly
elemental. The unified scheme of the received view of the philosophy of
science reHected not Machian elements-constituting the physical,
physiologicaL and psychological world -- but observation sentences
linked by correspondence rules to theorems, beginning and ending with
units of logicllanguage. The world here is what is symbolizable, coordi
native, resymbolizable: neither fact [TtltdIlCbel1] in the end (linked as
facts are with theory) nor thing (whatever a thing may be).

DISCLAIMING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Some might think it fair at this juncture to add the all-too-commonly
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cated than it once was. One no longer spends the whole of one's ana
lytic philosophic energies analyzing (according to the exactitude and
focus that is an irreducible part of such methodic precision) statements
such as "The cat is on the mat," but one allows oneself the still unex
hausted fit of fantasy indulged in by Tom Nagel who wondered "What
Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (with its predictable if not quite logical sequel:
"The View From Nowhere"). Or, more appositely, one might follow the
late David Lewis, who very charmingly begins his "Attitudes 'De
Dicto' and 'De Sew with the observation against expectations that is,
ladies and gentlemen-just to be sure that you do not miss it-a joke, a
piece of wit: "If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect
Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat."35 Of course, to the point
of punning, the patter of little feet, not to mention the talk of expecta
tions, refers, for speakers of ordinary idiomatic English, to children.
The joke brings in Bruce the cat, and the reference to the cat takes us
to the mat and the matter of reference. Lewis's observations are about
Meinongian attitudes, which is to say (or to be read), as shorthand
identilication for psychologism (a bad thing) or intentionality (possibly
a good thing, provided the intended intentionality is not that of the late
Husserl but rather the early, now redeemed as the Frege-like and
almost analytic Husser!). In this case the attitudes are explained as
incomplete where such expectations may be diversely filled in divers
houses (Lewis's specialty is possible worlds, so an array of possible
houses is no strain for him). These attitudes then are best rendered, so
Lewis, as having "propositional objects." We recall that for analysts,
propositions are technical devices, having, as sentences do not always
have, logical objects.
Note the utility of the style of this kind of talk for analytic purposes.
It is because we may be expected to be concerned with what we mean by
what we say (the charm of this concern is not least won from precisely
that clean or neat reference and conceptual-if none too taxing-ideal of
analytic clarity, which in turn consists in the play between notions of the
expected and what is as such, in other words and in another sense, de dido
and oe de) without at the same time and in fact aetlitIlly meanill.tJ anything
in particular by what we are saying that we are licensed to talk about
cats, bats, and brains in vats. The result of this linguistic explosion of
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deliberately irrelevant reference pennits us for the first time, if also and
admittedly only for the nonce, to consider meaning as such.
All of this can make for very entertaining reading (especially when
it is David Lewis one is reading) but this appeal does not go very far~
and this returns us once again to the problem at hand-",.jth regard to
the reference to the real world and when what is at stake matters as
much as science does. It is then that the analytic style, tactic and
schematic, runs into the proverbial ground and it does so without nec
essarily drawing attention to this fact among its practitioners.
The idea of going "to ground" or "seed" or better, ';.\.jth reference to
analysis, the purer fantasy-ideal (and its curiouser ambition) of a
"deflationary" appproach to philosophy-whereby, as Bar-On notes
above, the JLUXCJJjuf analyst finds himself at the end of the day with "less
and less of what to analyze" ~is manifest in the whimpering perpetua
tion of things as usual. This is the way the world ends in the face of
everything: a heat death which Nietzsche, a famously nonanalytic
philosopher, called nihilism.
And yet many argue that nary a practitioner of classically analytic
philosophy, like a dyed-in-the-wool practitioner of the formerly
received view in the philosophy of science, can be found on the books.
The problem is (in the parlance of informal fallacies) a straw man.
Analysis, it would seem, has long since been overcome. Against analytic
philosophy as a limiting modality? Against method in the philosophy of
science? \Vho~we might ask ourselves~isn't?
Indeed, quite some time ago now, a mainstream collection appeared
with the title PlA1t-Ana~1jlic P/)liNophy. Contributors (and putative post
analysts) included Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorry. Tom Nagel, Donald
Davidson, Thomas Kuhn, all of whom were (and still are) said to have
and were accordingly lionized for their intellectual integrity for having
done so~abjured analytic philosophy (and all its works). Yet it is evi
dent enough, where what matters on the terms of analysis itself is style,
analytic style and precisely not-such is the formal ideal-substance or
content, that no one of the above is. in fact. anywhere near postanalytic
and certainly none are what one would call "Continental." You can be
an anti-analytic philosopher. after all. as Rorty is, without turning into a
"Continental philosopher."36 [t is important to note that one can perse
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vere in one's allegiance to the analytic ideal and remain an analyst
v.rithout the analytic program-and this is an essential survival strategy
when its traditional adherents (Putnam, Nagel, Davidson) concede the
flaws of the program.
Such a righteous confidence is characteristic of established power
elites and a typical retort ("argument") to a critique such as the fore
going need do no more than dispute the given definition. Thus one
notes: X is averred (analysis is X). But, one counters to the contrary,
analytic philosophy is in fact also -X. Thus analytic philosophy (X) is
also some other thing -X ("X" includes its opposite) and to avoid con
tradiction, this becomes a matter of scopeY
These are analytic tactics: they sidestep the question, shifting
debate to formal (analytic) grounds and they do so in perfectly good
conscience (albeit perhaps not in perfect good faith). Like talk of "post
modern" philosophy of science (let alone postmodern
talk of
the end of philosophy, especially of analytic philosophy. is a piece of
Francis Fukayama-style overkill. For even if. politically and otherwise,
these are lively times we live in at the beginning of this new century, if
we are ideologically bound, at least by popular convention, to be plu
ralistic. to be open to new ideas. to different perspectives on east-west,
and to other ideologies. and if we are therefore, whether we like it or
not, living in a "postmodern" world, it nonetheless remains the case that
neither Richard Rorty and certainly not Jacques Derrida. nor the
unnamed demon of irrelevance, irrationalism, or relativism have gen
uine inl:luence in analytic philosophy. Nor are specialists in "irra
tionalism" (read: Continental-aka-hermeneutic-style philosophy)38
recruited at the university level for whatever few positions there are in
philosophy. The dominant departments remain analytic, and when they
recruit, even for historical positions specified as dealing with more or
less Continental thinkers (e.g.. Husser!' hardly ever Heidegger, never
exactly Nietzsche), recruit either newly minted or else retread analysts
(United Kingdom phenomenologists or German-trained analysts~the
last being even more fun than the former). And if (of all philosophical
subdisciplines) the philosophy of science is not nonanalytic, neither can
it be said that the philosophy of science is postmodern (either "already"
much less, let's be real: jill/lice).
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THE ANALYTIC-CONTINENTAL DIVIDE:
A DEBATE ON DIFFERENCE AND THE
QUESTION OF ANNEXATION
I have maintained that there i.J a difference between analytic and Conti
nental approaches to philosophy, not only because it is obvious and not
only because as a professor of philosophy I live on the terms of a profes
sion dominated by this noisome distinction, but because the claim that
there is no such distinctive divide is politically manipulative. Claiming
there is no analytic-Continental divide is an important step in the analytic
appropriation of the mantle (not the substance) of Continental philos
ophy. Why should the analysts want to appropriate the themes of Conti
nental philosophy? The short answer is that analytic philosophy has
exhausted itself; the extended and more interesting answer is because
Continental philosophy is sexy: the grad students want it!
The difference between so-called analytic and so-called Continental
styles of philosophy is a contentious matter of ideology and taste
"deflating questions" as opposed to reflecting on what is question-worthy,
as Heidegger would say, in a question. This difference also refers to one's
scholarly formation (the depth and breadth of the same, or calculated lack
thereof). and it is a matter of definition. Thus, disputes that dissolve the
diHerence (going in the presumably brave new direction of "just doing
good work," or speaking only of "good" -and by neat exclusion "bad"
philosophy) reinstate in a rather more insidious and value-laden way the
same distinction. Yet the advantage of denying any difference between
modalities of philosophy is considerable. because once the denial is in
place. Continental-style philosophy can be dismissed as bad or even as
"just not" philosophy. This is needed both to justifY one's inattention to
the work done by scholars working in the contemporary tradition of Con
tinental philosophy and, even more important. because analytic philosphy
wants to try its hand at themes formerly left to Continental modes of
thought. And such an annexation is securely under way. In addition to
self-propounded and blatantly self-serving Internet-posted daims 39 that
analytic schools oHer students the best opportunities for stud;ying Conti
nental philosophy, there are established analytic traditions of interpreting
(or criticizing) Nietzsche. Heidegger. Levinas, or Foucault. 40
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What, for example, does it mean to say that a thinker like Nietzsche
is already taught within the analytic tradition, as he has been, beginning
with Arthur Danto and Bernd Magnus and continuing with lVlaudemarie
Clark, Solomon/Schacht, and most recently, Robert Gooding-Wtlliams?
How can this work? Does one generate another "New" Nietzsche, on the
model of reading Nietzsche through the lens of French and German
thought?41 The answer to the narrower question here, is prima facie no,
because to read a so-called Continental philosopher on the terms of ana
lytic philosophy is exactly not to read him with a Continental lens
contra Leiter's opposed conviction on the matter. To answer the broader,
more appropriative question. we recall that the ideal of clarity. which
ideal presupposes a fundamental equality between styles of philosophical
expression, t;ypically excludes all but a certain kind of philosophy. It
assumes there is only analytic philosophy and that is just what philos
ophy is. Hence. the ruling discourse-today and for the greater part of
the last century-remains scientifically oriented or analytic philosophy.
Within this discourse, that is, for the majority of professional philosophic
thinkers, a philosopher like Nietzsche is condemned because what he
writes contradicts not only his own claims (a cardinal oHense from a log
ically analytic point of view) but more grievously still, the claims of phi
losophy itself. If, from its earliest beginnings. philosophy is traditionally
conceived in didactic contrast with popular thought. the philosophic
project also challenges itself. Nietzsche's critical philosophy does the
same and it also undermines the means of philosophic challenge per se:
questioning the tools of clear. logical thinking and rational argument by
questioning nothing less than logic together with the very epistemolog
ical utility of language.
Nietzsche's philosophical achievement thus resists ordering in the
received historical canon of philosophy. and throughout more than a
century since his death, his writings have proven to be remarkably
resistant to traditional comprehension. It turns out to be impossible to
"translate" Nietzsche into ordinary language philosophy, as it were,
although the analytic philosophic reception of his thought has sought to
do exactly that. Apart from a sovereign failure to discuss Nietzsche or to
conceive his contribution on a par with other philosophers (a failing as
evident in "serious" German as well as in French or English-language
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professional philosophical contexts), like the salacious aspects Nietzsche
detected within the supposedly scientific basis of pragmatic world cal
culi, the then-equivalent to what today's scientists could regard as
genomic or mitochondrial altruism (cr. the first section of 011 the
Genealogy 0/ JJ1orau) , Nietzsche's name is mostly used to add a "bit of
spice. "42 And if Nietzsche tends to be reduced to a philosopher of moral
outrage and artistic excess among the majority of scholars specializing
in his thought, Nietzsche's theory of truth and his concern with science
seems tendentious at best.
Hence of all the things Nietzsche is famous for, his critique of truth
has been his greatest liability, laying him open to the gleeful sophomoric
refutation that, because Nietzsche claims there is no truth and as this
proclamation itself claims truth, Nietzsche contradicts himself. A ver
sion of this expose makes an appearance in almost every discussion of
Nietzsche's theory of truth as a problem the interpretation first solemnly
concedes and then offers to correct, or else, failing to find a way out of
self-contradiction, to excuse for the sake of his moral or artistic or cul
tural insights. Kietzsche is much better known as the philosopher of
nihilism, a radical new morality, prophet of the death of God, teacher of
psychology as the royal road not to the Socratic legacy of the problem
of good and evil in the human heart but to the unconscious of philos
ophy, that is
not scientific (i.e., neither psychoanalytic nor cog
nitive) psychology but observational, popular, and populistic psycholo
gizing; and most notoriously, as the philosopher of fascist power. The
last thing Nietzsche's torrential style of philosophy wins praise for is its
contribution to a philosophic understanding of the Western enterprise of
science or truth.
Nevertheless, a number of books and essays treat exactly Niet
zsche's "problem" of truth, in addition to my own (rather uncompro
misingly Continental) studies discussing Nietzsche's epistemology and
philosophy of science ..J3 And rather than reflecting a development
intrinsic to Continental philosophy. the growing interest in the question
of Kietzsche and truth stems from analytic philosophy.44 Nevertheless,
and regrettably, such an analytic interest in Nietzsche's theory of truth
builds nothing like a "bridge"45 between Continental and analytic phi
losophy.46
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Thus, however intrinsically valuable, the increase in analytic
interest in (not only Nietzsche but other traditionally named) "Conti
nental" philosophers indicates nothing like a Continental turn within
analytic philosophy-it is annexation without responsibility and
",-ithout the rigors of a genuinely historicaL authentically interpretive
move. Nor is it a particular blessing in the case of Nietzsche studies
because analytic philosophers typically take only as much as they can
"stand" from Nietzsche, not puzzling over but instead (this is the classic
analytic tactic) dismissing the rest as unsupportable, while maintaining
that Nietzsche (had he sufficient sense -as he manifestly had not,
hence the counterfactually rhetorical success of this claim) would have
done so as well. But to test Nietzsche's philosophy, not on his own com
plicated terms, but on the standards of logical exigence or the received
discourses of the day leaves Nietzsche lacking (as it hamstrings
Adorno, and Heidegger. and so many others, albeit in difFerent ways, as
varieties of so many different kinds of TocJtrlchwelgerei).
Beyond questions concerning the political tactic of appropriating a
popular figure or movement (endemic as it is to the rhetorical advance
and practice of power), I think it worthwhile to examine the reasons
contemporary scholars who take themselves to be Continental are not
concerned ",-ith Nietzsche's critique of truth or theories of knowledge,
but instead focus on Nietzsche's aesthetics, his (anti) feminism, his
(anti) theology, his (anti) political thinking. Contrary to what 1 have said
about the legacy of Continental thought as it can be found in Heidegger
and others, today's Continental philosophy echoes the mainstream (and
analytic) approach to Nietzsche's thinking while sidestepping any refer
ence that would cause it to raise epistemological questions in Nietzsche.
Constituted within the institutional bearing of the analytic tradition
from Europe to the United Kingdom to America and across the globe,
including contemporary Germany and France-Continental philosophy
increasingly reflects exactly the values and interests analytic philosophy
relegates to itY Analytic philosophy thus defines its language, its stan
dards of rigor. its focal approach. its "tyie as uniquely valid for crucial
questions in philosophy.48 This value idea refers to the approbation of
good or quality (valid and valuable) work in philosophy. It is the differ
ence between good (or clear) writing and what one wishes to condemn as
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obscure (/lot transparent to the reading mind, Mt available in advance of
a text to be read or discussed).49 But at issue is a single question of style.
Where analytic philosophy is the only game or stylistic scheme in town, its
approach rules in the academy (which is, in our culture. increasingly the
only surviving locus of philosophy)50 and analytic philosophy collapses
everything "vithin its definitional, conceptual world view. ken, or to use
Nietzschean terms: perspective or conviction, prejudice or optic.
In a number of ways, the analytic reading of Nietzsche's philosophy
reducing its importance to so-called value thinking thus crosses analytic
and Continental boundaries. 5l In the larger tradition of philosophy apart
from Nietzsche, ethical, cultural. and sociopolitical. and, above all, the
ological questions are treated as subsequent to logic and apart from the
theory of knowledge and philosophy of science. 52 The problem is that
this way of reading Nietzsche ineluctably overlooks or disregards what
is most of philosophical value in Nietzsche. Contra analytic appropria
tions and critical corrections of Nietzsche's epistemological thinking and
also exactly contra the majority of "Continental" appropriations. the
notion of "truth and lie" is not to be reduced to the question of morality
for Nietzsche, but rather the other way around. Nietzsche is much less
the moral or ethical or cultural-political philosopher he is thought to be,
than he is preoccupied (from start to finish and in the most rigorously
scientific manner he knew) with the question of knowledge and truth.
The moral problem of science for Nietzsche is that science (dclenlia or
knowing) itself sets the standard for all accounts of scientific theory,
practice, and progress. Like religion -and every other invention of the
ascetic ideal-science cannot be questioned on terms other than its
own. 53

For Nietzsche, the assumption that drives such compartmentaliza
tion is the key" conviction" or prejudice of the philosopher. In its current
expression, this philosophic prejudice holds that philosophic questions
on moral. political, cultural, theological. and rhetorical or philological
issues are ,'econrJlll'Y issues ("values") and, so ordered, can be regarded as
being without epistemological consequence. Such diverse and "soft"
questions have no relevance for the philosophic questions of truth or
epistemology and nothing to do with the "fact" or philosophy of science.
The separation of issues of philosophic inquiry and the ideal estimation
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of "significance" reflects the convictions of the philosophic tradition,
analytic and otherwise. 54 It assumes a hierarchy between these separate
issues (philosophy of truth is higher than moral or value philosophy)
and it is the very core of what Nietzsche named "the pro6!em oj'JCiellce" as
a problem. 55
Although the Continental approach has nearly abandoned its own
heritage by taking over its definition from analytic quarters, it can be
argued that it is still possible for it to draw upon the basic historico
hermeneutic prerequisites for adverting to what Nietzsche has to offer
in all its manifold philosophical complexity. This is important because,
as Nietzsche wrote in a late draft note on the aphorisms prefacing his
Twilight 0/ theJJo!." "Everything that is simple [eL~/;uh] is just plain imag
inary, it is not 'true."'56 "Rather," Nietzsche observed favoring com
plexity in spite of its logical inconvenience, precisely as such complexity
is relevant to science and its claims about the world: "\Vhat is actual,
what is true, is neither One nor yet to be reduced to One. u57
Such an interest in complexity is the heart of Nietzsche's episte
mology. Rather than simplicity, inspired by the sensibility of an
Ockham or the very different operational concerns of a Quine, Niet
zsche contends that getting at the truth of the world is the effort to
articulate the unspeakably complicated. 58 Where Continental readings
such as those of Heidegger or Lowith or Deleuze or Klossowski
embrace and intensi(y the complexity of Nietzsche's thought, analytic
readings by contrast, especially those concerned with Nietzsche's
account of truth, simplify or clarifY what Nietzsche meant, or else they
propose to tell us-according to the title of one demystifying recent
(stolidly deflationary) book-"What Nietzsche Really Said."
Even in the absence of a simple or straightforward bridge between
analytic and Continental perspectives, the task of reading Nietzsche in
terms of his relevance to truth and the project of knowing (including
exactly scientific knowing) echoes across the philosophic differences
and sensibilities constituting the analytic-Continental divide. In this
esoteric/exoteric sense, it may be said that Nietzsche's thought persists
as a kind of conceptual dynamite interior to philosophy, both Conti
nental and analytic.
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FROM NIETZSCHE'S COMPLEX TRUTH (AND
LIE) TO HEIDEGGER'S TALK OF LANGUAGE
AS SPEECH
In most defining accounts of analytic philosophy. the "deflationary"
approach to philosophy as it was described at the start is evident. as is
a relative nastiness vis-a.-vis Continental approaches to philosophy.
Thus one author contrives this demarcationalist definition: "If the term
analytic philosophy is to be a useful classificatory term. it must do more
work than merely to distinguish mainstream Western philosophy from
the rel1ections of philosophical sages or prophets, such as Pascal or
Nietzsche, and from the obscurities of speculative metaphysicians, such
as Hegel, Bradley or Heidegger."59 This stolidly polemical move side
lines Nietzsche as a prophet (along with a no less religious thinker than
Pascal) and calumniates the Heidegger who constantly refused the
metaphysical label.
It is not the case that Continental philosophy is not concerned with
language. It is. \Vhat it is not concerned with is logical analysis-and it
seems to invite reflection on obscurity. Thus Heidegger can write,
"Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What is said wells up
from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken saying which per
vades the design of language. Language speaks in that it. as showing,
reaching into all regions of presences. summons from them whatever is
present to appear and to fade."60
Heidegger is not unaware that this style of writing leaves him open
to the charge of unclarity, and he quite plainly adverts to his own redu
plicative style: "Language itself is language. The understanding that is
schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and
hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology.
Merely to say the identical thing twice-language is language-how is
that supposed to get us anywhere?"6! Heidegger answers this critical
question by affirming that progress is exactly not his goal: "But we do
not want to get anywhere. "62 For Heidegger, the passion for novelty and
the latest discoveries are distracting tendencies of the modern era and
irrelevant to thought itself, especially to philosophy.63 Heidegger was an
indefatiguable advocate of the impracticability-the uselessness-of
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philosophy, but he was so for a very provocative reason: "Granted that
we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy. if we
concern ourselves with it. do something with IU?"64 This is an extraordi
nary query: it has something of that element which catches one up in
considering the nature of philosophy and in thinking about thinking
itself, particularly the kind of thinking concerning life,
Hannah Arendt recalls the rumor of Heidegger's "kingship among
teachers," \Vhat she (and her fellow students) meant by such an
expression reflected the excitement of thinking as a radically new and
creative engagement with what invites reflection ("calls for thinking")
and it was expressed as an invitation: "One can perhaps learn to
think:'65 In Arendt's expression, "the rumor regarding Heidegger's
kingship among teachers was simply this: the cultural treasures of the
past, believed to be dead. are being made to speak. in the course of
which it turns out that they propose things altogether different than
what had been thought."66
Arendt's reflections on the chance to learn to think as a possibility
still reserved for us today, recollects what Heidegger had to say about
philosophy:
To philosophize is to inquire into the e"lra-ordinary. But because as we
have just suggested, this questioning recoils upon itselF, not only what
is asked after is extraordinary but also the asking itself. In other words:
this questioning does not lie along the way so that one day. unexpect
edly. we collide with it. Nor is it part of eve~yday life: there is no
requirement or regulation that forces us into it: it gratifies no urgent or
prevailing need. The questioning is "out of order." It is entirely volun
tary. based wholly and uniquely on the mystery of freedom, on what
we have called the leap. The same Nietzsche said "Philosophy ... is a
living amid ice and mountain heights." To philosophize we may now
say, is an extra-ordinary inquiry into the extra-ordinary."!

Thinking thus is above all /lot about making progress and for Hei
degger. philosophy was anything but a matter of "solving problems." in
Karl Popper's influential (and very positivist) definition of it. Thinking
philosophically, to be distinguished for Heidegger from thinking prac
tically or from scientifically involved questioning. exemplifies ques
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tioning as a search for understanding rather than as a search for an
answer. Philosophy for Heidegger remains where it has its origin: in
astonishment. Rather than killing or blunting it with pat answers, how
ever coherent. however clear, philosophy keeps that wonder alive in us.
Although the subject matters of Continental and analytic
approaches to philosophy may seem similar, their stylistic approaches
differ and what they ask about is likewise different. Continental philos
ophy, in its many variations, and despite its recent weakening as it
defers to the dominant perspective of analytic philosophy, attempts to
keep the meaning of philosophy as the love of wisdom always within its
purview. The pursuit of wisdom is all about meaning as it is understood
by living beings. Thus the object of philosophy is often said to be the
meaning oflife. Analytic philosophy concerned with moral issues seeks
to articulate rules and methods to resolve problems. Continental
approaches to such moral questions-such as that exemplified in Niet
zsche's genealogical critique of morality-emphasize the paradoxes of
such issues so that even seemingly simple terms like good (even
meaning r approve of this-in the simplified analysis of good) become
fraught with self-interest and self-aggrandizement. and what hitherto
fore seemed to embody altruistic motives is revealed instead as selfish
and as opposed to altruism, and yet just this self-interest is revealed as
the essence of altruistic behavior.
In addition to its more robust characterization of the subject of phi
losophy-concerning life- and human-meaning, born out of history.
imbued with value, and limited by the contingencies of its own cultural
and historical horizon, etc., Continental philosophy also has a
markedly different view of language. For Continental thinkers, language
is inseparable from rhetoric, metaphor, context, history, and, again. life.
There is, to quote Nietzsche's amusing statement of this limitation in
DaY/Jreak.. no place for us to stand to take a look at the world as it would
appear to us if we dl~) IUIt carry around these all-too-human heads. There
is no way to afford ourselves the dream fantasm of a disembodied. utterly
objective "view from nowhere," nor can we pretend to a god's-eye view.
For the Continental thinker, the ideal of objectivity is correlate to the
subject's own perspective. Hence the objective is the subjective: the per
spective of the object as regarded from the point of view of the subject.
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The great disadvantage of dissolving the academic discipline with
which you are engaged is that you eventually end up with nothing to
think or talk about. This is the great danger of modeling one's profes
sion on the ideal of the sciences. which themselves aim. eventually or
"in theory," to explain everything, That is the ambition to know. in
Stephen Hawking's unnervingly unsophisticated expression of the aim
of science: "the mind of God." Trivially. for the philosopher. this is to
talk oneself out of a job (this is more than merely cognitive redun
dancy) and to renounce philosophy - not, to be sure. as the Bible
denounced philosophy in favor of the true knowledge of the Lord, but
as a confining vessel of past mistakes, from which one has now, as a
very clever fly, at last mapped an accurate flightpath carrying one out
of the bottle and out of the game.
More seriously. and more reprehensibly. it is clear that to be able to
resolve the problems of philosophy-the possibility of knowing the
mind of God-does not necessarily mean that everything then makes
sense. This is because what makes sense can do so only within a par
ticular conceptual or cognitive scheme (and this is as true for Davidson
or MacIntyre as it is for Nietzsche). One can explain what death is
without being able to explain why a particular individual dies, much
less being able to explain why some mortal beings happen to die. as all
of them do. at one time rather than another: the contingent-the
individual-eludes such comprehension. Beyond the question of the
day and the hour is the question of the meaning of death which. for its
part. is tied to the question of the meaning of life: in what way does the
manner of our death punctuate our lives? Does it make a difference if
we die at our own hands. whether in a suicide of impetuous youth or
the practical choice of euthanasia for a latter management of pain and
debility? If we die at a stranger's hand? If we die of cancer caused by a
carcinogen disseminated from a local manufacturing plant or
omnipresent in food. but differentially affecting human subjects, so that
cancer is only a reaction in some of those individuals exposed to the
same agent? If we die of a cancer we carry in our blood line? If we thin
the ozone layer to the point that we die of cancer caused by irradiation?
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If we bomb ourselves to death'! And what does death mean for the one
still living: does one simply live on in an absence or is it not much rather
that the absence marks the life of the living, so that a kind of presence
yet remains'! What is the meaning of death'!
What is the meaning of love? Analytic philosophers who write on
this topic-and there are far more who do so than one would have sup
posed, even limiting suppositions to their own account of themselves
and of their lives-generate very lengthy tomes about love. 68 In such
treatments, love is typically redescribed and requalified to death. This
is especially so. because the one thing such analysts do not begin to
inquire about is the nature of love. Instead. what is taken to be love is
what everyone already knows or, more commonly, what the author pre
sumes he knows about love, redefined or redescribed: analyzed. But
not everyone knows what love iSi however. this suggestion would sur
prise our analysts, much less how to love (Nietzsche maintained that
one needed to leal'll how to love just to start). But what is love? What
is abundance and generosity'! Forbearance and gratitude? Is love dif
ferent, as Aristotle thought, for a child or a parent, a man or a woman,
a beautiful friend, a clever companion'l To begin to ask about love
requires all the unclarity and all the paradox oflove itself. which Gillian
Rose, at the end of a life inspired by pain and the prospect of her own
too-soon and all-too-knowable death. called the "work" of love. If one
produces a definition of love that fails to capture that paradoxical elu
sive essence, one will not have begun even to think of love, much less
to offer a philosophical account of it. 69
\Vhen Heidegger raises the question of death in his reflections on
the limitations and ultimate possibilities of human being as circum
scribed not by thought but the dynamic contours of time, the question
of such a "being unto death" reflects not morbidity but life. And what
is the meaning of God? What do we mean by speaking of a being
defined as utterly beyond human comprehension? Can we think of
God? \Vhat do we think of when we think we do? How can we know
something we cannot know? Can we conceive a divinity, a being
greater than which is not to be imagined, an infinite, omnipotent, self
caused creator of the world and everything in it? Or is our monothe
istic thought of God, as Nietzsche wondered if it might be. nothing
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more than a de-deification of a god-filled world, a "monotono-theism"7o
-as Nietzsche named it -little better than, and more than half way to
the disenchanted universe of a science bent on replacing divinity with
a singularity at the beginning: the big bang as the boy scientist's idea of
God. The rationalistic justification of atheism, however, is itself only
another kind of "better knowing." As Nietzsche would say, the claim to
know and the claim not to know are both overweening claims, pre
suming in each case to know too much.
And what does the question of God tell us about ourselves, if God
is only our own all-too-Freudian illusion? Far more significantly, what
do we learn about ourselves, as Nietzsche asks us to reflect, when we
recall that it was we ourselves who killed God in the first place? And
the question of freedom, tied to the question of self or the subject, who
is it that speaks whenever one speaks? One is not transparent to one
self, one has no more certain knowledge of oneself than one has of the
universe, of the past or the future. If one wills one's subjugation is one
less or no less subject? If there are unconscious motivations, if we are
beings whose thoughts are manifestations of brain and body functions,
what can be said of freedom? What is an illusion, what is truth? what
is lie? Nietzsche, who began to raise questions of this kind, as we have
seen, reaped a harvest of contradictions in his philosophy - but more
insights into the nature of truth and indeed of human beings who use
language to think about truth than many other, more sanguine and
clear philosophers.
To questions like these, and certainly to ones far better framed, ana
lytic philosophers have answers, rather a lot of them, carefully repeated
in the literature. For their part (and this should be kept in mind when
reading authors like Heidegger and Nietzsche), Continental philoso
phers tend less to answer or conclude inquiry than to compound their
own (and our responding) questions-adverting to ambiguity,
unclarity, complexity, and all the detail that ultimately is required to
begin to think philosophy as the meaning of life.
It is significant that of the analytic answers given, none would seem
to have purchase or staying power, not even for the analysts them
selves. Hence, having seemingly exhausted their own mandate and with
it their own project, analytic philosophy has begun to turn toward Con
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tinental philosophy. Not. alas. as a reprochement. not by inviting prac
titioners of Continental philosophy to join the discussion. but only. and
as if bored to tears by their own analytic themes. taking up the themes
(and the names. like Nietzsche. Heidegger. and Deleuze) of Conti
nental philosophy. For the analytic tradition is intentionally bankrupt
(this is the internal logic of the analytic method). but although rendered
moribund at its own hand. within the profession (aka academic and edi
torial control) it enjoys the power of the majority or dominant tradition.
To keep itself going it means to seize (but not to "think") the spiritual
capital of a tradition whose own authority is denounced as that of non
or "bad" philosophy.
The claim is thus that analytic philosophy can do what Continental
philosophers do, only better. But this is ultimately unclear. not only
because unclarity belongs to the essence of what it is that Continental
philosophers do (and such unclarity is anathema to analytic philos
ophy) but also because the analy1:ic method is intrinsically self
dissolving: whatever it takes into its mind. it ends up clarifying or ana
lyzing away. Analytic philosophy as the clarification of questions or as
the enterprise of problem solving works elegantly for idle problems of
logic -one thinks of Russell's "tea-table"7] -or for crossword and other
puzzles (or within a closed system or defined universe of variables). but
it may be that there is still yet more in heaven (and out of it) than
dreamt of in such a philosophy.
And Continental philosophy does know this and can share this.
Ambiguity is part of reality (even science has to deal with this. as
empirical scientists along with engineers and physicians know well
enough) and ambiguity is part of being human. One cannot simply add
analysis and stir-magically expecting to separate what one imagines to
be the lead of philosophical ambiguity from the gold of clear insight.
It is high time to institute the possibility of a conversation between
styles: Continental and analY1:ic. As my own teacher. the late Hans
Georg Gadamer has reminded us. doing philosophy is more about con
versation than arguments ("good or bad"). Beyond contentious
estrangements. conversation is a mutually contaminating endeavor: one
shares -one does not eliminate-prejudices between horizons. 72
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NOTES
I. Michael Dummett, Origin.f 0/ Analytical Philo.mpby (London: Duck
worth, 1993) p. 4. Ray Monk expresses the most impatience with Dummett's
definition of analytic philosophy via Frege. For Monk, Dummett's claim that
"the philosophy of language is the foundation of all other philosophy" worked
itself into what has in its reception likewise become "an unashamed piece of
dogmatism" (Monk. "Was Russell an Analytic Philosopher," in TheRileo/Ana
~vtic Philo.wphy, ed. Hans-Johann Glock [Oxford: Blackwell, 1977J, p. 35).
2. Martin Heidegger, What /.1 Caffed Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and
J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 4.
3. And Heidegger adds that to be capable of thought "we must before all
else incline toward what addresses itself to thought." where what eludes and
thus calls for thought draws us into thinking, and "drawn to what withdraws,
we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable
nearness of its appeal" (Heidegger, What /,1 Caffed Thinking, p. 17). Heidegger
declares this at the beginning and repeats it at the conclusion of his book. Thus
thinking, like questioning, is to be sustained even in the face of ambiguity and
contradiction. What is essential for Heidegger is hearing the language of
thought, and that involves the paradox of attending to what is unthought:
"Letting every thinker's thought come to us as something in each case unique,
never to be repeated, inexhaustible-and being shaken to the depths by what
is unthought in his thought." What "is unthought in a thinker's thought," Hei
degger takes care to remind us, "is not a lack inherent in his thought. What is
lin-thought is there in each case only as the un-thllllpM. The more original the
thinking, the richer 'will be what is unthought in it" (Heidegger, r.v'l~at /,1 CaNed
Thini:illg, p. 76).
4. Note that Heidegger is always careful to advert to the nature of logic
in the context of language: "Logic as the doctrine of /(Igll,f, considers thinking
to be the assertion of something about something" (Heidegger, If/htlf /.1 Calleo
Thinkin.'!' p. 155). He also notes the evolution of logic beyond two-valued
thinking: "For dialectic, a IIIg"" in the customary form of a proposition is never
unequivocal "(p. 156). and he claims that "where thought encounters things
that can no longer be apprehended by logic, those things which are by nature
inapprehensible still are within the purview of logic -as a-logical, or no longer
logical, or meta-logical (supra-logical) "(p, 157).
5. Heidegger, What I., Calleo Thinkin.'!' p, 118.
6. John Skorupski. "Why Did Language Matter to Analytic Philos
ophy?" in Monk. Ri'e 0/ Analytic Phi/;Nophy, p. 77.
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7. Intriguingly, and perhaps counter to expectations, it is this latter dis
tinction that entails that 0:mtinental philosophy (and only Continental philos
ophy) is critically poised to reHect on science. Such a claim for a special and
criticial privilege was one of Ivlartin Heidegger's strongest assertions in the
spirit of the later Edmund Husser!' Heidegger offered a two-fold challenge
regarding the domination of logic in philosophy and as the sole guideline for
thought as well as against science's claim to think or conceptualize its own
nature. Regarding the power claim of what we today would recognize as ana
lytic philosophy, he wrote: "In many places, above all in the Anglo-Saxon
countries, logistics is today considered the only possible form of strict philos
ophy. because its result and procedures jrield an assured profit for the con
struction of the technological universe. In America and elsewhere,
as
the only proper philosophy of the future is thus beginning today to seize power
over the intellectual world" (Heidegger, What I•• CalLcd ThiJlkul,q, p. 21). For
Heidegger, the sciences were inevitably blind to their own nature; scientiti
cally, Heidegger would argue, a science could not conduct an inquiry into
itsel[ "By way of histo!)" a man will never Find out what histo!), is; no more
than a mathematician can show by way of mathematics-by means of his sci
ence, that is, and ultimately by mathematical formulae-what mathematics is.
The essence of their spheres- histo!),. art. poet!)'. language. nature, man,
God --remains inaccessible to these disciplines" (Heidegger, What I" CalIi'd
Thinkiug, pp. 32-3'3). Inevitably, necessarily, the sciences. "are always in the
dark about the origin of their own nature" (p. 43).
8. Heidegger, What I" LillLcd Thinkin.'!'
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Die grogte Masse
Arbeit in der Wis
senschart verschwendet-auch hier noch waltet das Princip der grogt
moglichen
Dummheit,"
Slimtliche lf7erke, Krit,;.che Studienall,'p,;{'e
(Munich/Berlin, New York: DTV/De Gruyter. 1980) vol. II, p. 90. (Subse
quent references to Kriti..ehe StuJicllau'(9a6e [KSA] indicate volume and page
number alone.) It should be noted that. antecedent to historical and social
studies of science, criticaltheo!),. another component of so-called Continental
philosophy, went far to highlight the ideology embedded in the social practice
of the natural sciences.
10. And this indeed is what Continental thinking does do in the persons
of Nietzsche. HusserJ. and Heidegger, even Derrida, Foucault. and Lyotard.
See the many studies by Patrick A. Heelan. Joseph J. Kockelmans. Theodore
Kisiel. Babette E. Babich. etc .• as well as, in German and in French, Rainer
Bast. Pierre Kerszberg, the late Dominique Janicaud, Thomas Seebohm. Jean
Salanskis. and so on.
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11. See citation for Dummett in note I, and Cohen in note 18. See Origin"
N. Giere and A. W. Richardson (Minneaplis: Uni
versity of Minnesota Press, 1996); Michael Friedman, &colI<liJering Lt1gli'al P(M
itivum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and The Parting of the
Way.; (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 2001).
12. Analytic philosophy is not only the reigning approach to philosophy
in the U.S. and England, but also on the larger European continent, where the
influence of analytic philosophy is arguably completely dominant in today's
globalized era of uniformity.
13. Friedman's The Partu~q of the W/ay" is particularly sensitive to this issue.
14. Although one established analytic scholar (Stanley Cavell) laughs off
the difference between continental and analytic philosophy, recent reviews of
academic philosophy in the U.S. highlight the question or problem of Conti
nental philosophy (Hilary Putnam, Alexander Nehamas in DaeJaIU<f, 1996).
But Brian Leiter's line-analytic philosophy 1:' Continental philosophy (only
more so) - has increasingly come to be regarded as standard.
15. 1 refer to Friedman's "Reconsidering Logical Positivism" as well as his
study of Heidegger and Carnap in Origin,' of Lt1gical Empiric,,'m, ed. Giere and
Richardson. which latter study grew into Friedman·s. The Partin.q of the lViI.Y<'.
16. Linguistic analysis and critical theory deploy different methodic tools
in different contexts for different ends.
17. See Roy A. Sorenson. R,eudo-Prof,kml: How Analytic PhilMophy (jet,.
DOlle (London: Routledge. 1993) for an enthusiastic treatment of this approach
to philosophy (and it should be noted that the author refines the definition of'
analytic philosophy by characterizing his OV>Tl approach as "vigorously" Amer
ican). See also Skorupski. "Why Did Language ,1Y1atter to Analytic Philos
ophy?" in Ri.e of Ana~ylu' Philo,'ophy. p. 77.
18. L. Jonathan Cohen. The DUILogue of &a"on: An Ana/y"", ofAna(ytiral Phi
l,\,ol'ry (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1986). p. 31.
19. Ibid., p. 32.
20. Parody seems not out of place where the propositional claim uttered by
Patrick A. Heelan (the Irishman who first taught me the philosophy of science),
"'F the moon is made of green cheese, I am a Dutchman," may continue to be
counted as an implication that aflords logically valid grounds for Feyerabend's
favorite conclusion. "Anything goes." The series of paragraphs to follow are
based on material originally included in my essay. "Against Analysis, Against
Postmodemism" (the lead presentation for a conference on Postmodern Philos
ophy of Science held in Dubrovnik at one of the very last international confer
ences held there before war broke out later in 1991). In Continental and Po..t
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modern Per''Pcctil'&1 in the Philf).}of'hy of Science, ed. Babette 1'..:. Babich, Debra B.
Bergoffen, and Simon V. Glynn (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1995).
21. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Traclatw-Logico-Philf)(}ophicIM, trans. D. F. Pears
and B. F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Pau!' 1974),4.ll6.
22. Ibid., 4.112.
23. To vary David Lewis's expression in his "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De
Se'" of the implications of Wittgenstein's notion of expression and clarity: If it
is possible to have unclarifiable (unanalytic) problems but no unanalyzable
propositions, anything propositionally articulated-which in this sense means
clearly expressed -can be analysed. As Lewis states the virtues of proposi
tional knowledge, "... if it is possible to lack knowledge and not to lack any
propositional knowledge, then the lacked knowledge must not be proposi
tional." See Lewis, "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se,'" in Tl7e PhiJ.fJ,lOpbicai
Rrvieu' 9 (1979). Also in Phil{),lOpbica! Paper,', vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), p. 139.
24. This is not to say that all analytic philosophers are opposed to meta
physics; many are not. Nor does it mean that anaJ.y1ic philosophy excludes belief
in God; it does not. But the analytic idea of metaphysics is not
particularly-I use this adjective advisedly-roblMt. Likewise, the God of the
analytic philosopher of religion would seem to be even further than the Carte
sian conception of God from the God of the theologian, just as the God of all
such scholarly reRections seems ineluctably distant from the God of faith or rev
elation. Note too that I am not here asserting that Continental philosophers of
religion, such as John Caputo, Richard Kearney, or, indeed, 1'..:mmanuel Levinas,
are necessarily any better off in this regard, though 1 do hold that they might be.
25. It is important to emphasize-as it otherwise could appear that one
has to do with a tradition covering many more years than is actually the case
for the philosophy of science, analytic, Continental, or any other kind-that
the so-called received view in analytic philosophy of science has had an
exceedingly short tenure for a defining philosophical structure. The Cartesian
account of the role of the pineal gland could claim both a lengthier reign and
greater fecundity. See Frederick Suppe's "The Search for Philosophic Under
standing of Scientific Theories," in The Structure oj Scielltific TlmwIN, ed. Fred
erick Suppe (Urbana: Cniversity of illinois Press. 1974), pp. 3-232.
26. Philipp Frank. "Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung," o"twalJ;, Annalen de,.
MlllIrpbito,'of'hie 6 (1907): 443-50.
27. Craig Dilworth, "Empiricism vs. Realism: High Points in the Debate
During the Past 150 Years," Studie.llil the H,;,toryalld Phil().Iophyoj!Jcience 21, no.
3 (1990): 431-62.

Bahich: On the

28. Tom Sorrel, Scun/klm: Pbilo(}of'by an
(London: Routledge. 1991). It is significant in t
path breaking collection by Werner Cal1ebaut.
How the Rral Pbiw,Iophy 0/ Science J" DOlle (Chic~
Press. 1993) does not include Continentally m
ingly exhaustive tour of the various historical. :
ical currents parallel to and intersecting the phil
R. Wetterstein's 1982 essay "The Philosophy on
ence: Separate Domains versus Separate Aspee!
no. 1 (1982): 59-79 and his effort to untangle tt
division of intellectual labor whereby philosoph
ally attempted to keep their philosophical prol
ones and historians of science have traditionall.
torica! problems separate from historical ones" (
progress despite. or much more likely, becau.1e 0/
29. Rom Harre. The PhllNophie.1 of Science
Press. 1972), p. 29.
30. Ian Hacking, "'Style' for Historians an
Hldtory and PhlIO,lof'hy of Science 23. no. 1 (1992):
31. Rudolf Haller, "Atomism and Holism,"
of'hy. eds. Gerhard Schurz and George J. W.
1991 ). p. 266
32. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea
Davidson, Rrference Truth <lnd Reality: &<iay.J
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). pp..
33. See Babette K Babich. "From Fleck's
Conceptual Schemes and Incommensurability."
l(hlophy (Jf Science 71 (2003).
34. A. Z. Bar-On, "Wittgenstein and P
WiJtgen,'tein. Rille Neuebewertlln.iJ: Toward,) a New R,
al. (Vienna: Holder- Pichler-Tempsky, 1990), p.
35. Lewis." Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De S
36. As we shall see in greater detail below, '
little more than the ideal of expressive clarity.
37. See for an instanciation of such de marc,
Hacker, "The Rise of'lwentieth Century Analyl
lytic Phiifl"ophy, p. 52.
38. This is especially true of that kind of
associated not with the softer theories of ethics

Babich: On

tbe

fJllall/fu:-L,onftn'ental

97

28. Tom Sorrel. Seienti.Jm: PhilO.fophy and the Infataatuill wilh Seima
(London: Routledge. 1991). It is significant in this context that the putatively
path breaking collection by \Verner Callebaut. Taking the NaturaliAic 1ilm or
How the Real PhiLo,'ophy of Science I" DOlle (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. 1993) does not include Continentally minded practioners in its seem
ingly exhaustive tour of the various historical. sociological. and anthropolog
ical currents parallel to and intersecting the philosophy of science. Thus John
R. Wetterstein's 1982 essay "The Philosophy of Science and the History of Sci.
ence: Separate Domains versus Separate Aspects." The PhilNophical Forum xiv.
no. 1 (1982): 59-79 and his effort to untangle the problems resulting from the
division of intellectual labor where~y philosophers of science "have tradition
ally attempted to keep their philosophical problems separate from historical
ones and historians of science have traditionally attempted to keep their his
torical problems separate from historical ones" (p. 59), has not seen overmuch
progress despite. or much more likely. !,ecau,it! of the spirit of Karl Popper.
29. Rom Harre. The PhillMllphie.1 of Science (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972), p. 29.
30. Ian Hacking. "'Style' for Historians and Philosophers." Studie.1 in the
Ht;'tory and Philo,l(Iphy of Science 23. no. 1 (1992): 12.
31. Rudolf Haller, "Atomism and Holism," in Advance,! in Scientllic Phil{1,l
ophy. eds. Gerhard Schurz and George J. W. Dorn (Amsterdam: Rodopi.
1991). p. 266
32. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in
Davidson, Reference Truth ,1I1d Reality: eMl1]1<1 on the Philfl"(Iphy of l<1niJllfl.qe
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1980), pp. 183-98.
33. See Babette E. Babich, "From Fleck's Denk,ltil to Kuhn's Paradigm:
Conceptual Schemes and Incommensurability." Illtemationlli Studie.1 ill the Phi
lvopby 45'cience 71 (2003).
34. A. Z. Bar-On. "Wittgenstein and Post-Analytic Philosophy," in
If/itt!/en.,tein. Eine Neae/'I'U'ertlln,q: Toward.1 a New Rel'aillati'on II. ed. Leinfellner et
aL (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990). p. 260.
35. Lewis, "Attitudes 'De Dicto' and 'De Se.'" p. 133.
36. As we shall see in greater detail below, analytic style as such refers to
little more than the ideal of expressive clarity.
37. See for an instanciation of such demarcational accomodation. P. M. S.
Hacker. "The Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy." in Rife 4 Ana
lytic Philo,lophy, p. 52.
38. This is especially true of that kind of Continental style philosophy
associated not with the softer theories of ethics or the political world (critical
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theory and so on) but with analytic turf-encroaching topics such as episte
mology, in Husserlian phenomenology and (via Nietzsche and Heidegger)
hermeneutics.
39. I refer to Brian Leiter's "guide" to graduate study in Continental phi
losophy in the U.S. See, in particular, www.philosophicalgourmet.com/ana
Iytic.htm. A controversy has grown up around the Internet site in question.
The American Philosophical Association (APA) has undertaken to censure the
site and a small bit of debate has emerged regarding the site in the Society for
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), a Continentally oriented
society increasingly similar in terms of nonindusiveness and disenfranchised
membership to the APA, etc. Leiter's self~posted site (now hosted by Blackwell
Publishers) encourages the idea that the best places to "do" Continental phi
losophy are to be found in analytic departments and not necessarily the more
Ivy League of all departments, hence the APA's (always Ivy-friendly) nonsup
port. Leiter's idea is that Continental philosophy is a matter of theme or figure
(Leiter, like Clark and Schacht and Richardson, reads Nietzsche) rather than
style. This conviction yields the claim that analytic philosophy i.J Continental
philosophy. Predictably then, in a recent defensive response to David
Hoekhema's review of Bruce \Vilshire's collection of essays, Leiter goes so far
as to style bil11.1e/f a persecuted "Continental philosopher," thus refusing
Wilshire's/Hoekhema's critique as "anti-Continentally" inspired.
40. In addition to Bert Dreyfus's long-standing analytic clarification of
Heidegger, there are studies by Guignon, Blattner, and Phippse. Nietzsche has
long been gingerly managed by analytic purveyors such as Arthur Danto and
Bernd Magnus, but with Maudemarie Clark's book analyzing Nietzxbe and
Truth, this trend is now mainstream (and this can be seen in younger scholars
such as Anderson, Cox, Welshon, etc.), even beyond extremes such as, on the
one hand, Leiter and Richardson on the other. In the case of Levinas, the most
analytic account to date remains that of Simon Critchley, who also has a nicely
analytic book on the theme, Contmental PbiloJ(lpby: A Very Sbort IntrOduction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
41. See David B. Allison, Tbe Nell' NietA:.1cbe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 200 I).
42. Gerald Holton thus afffects the Nietzschean terms Apollinian and
Dionysian to distinguish philosophic approaches to characterizing the history
of science, but his terms in fact have no particular relevance (nor do they refer)
to Nietzsche.
43. See my NietMfebe:' Pb,lo.IOphy af Science: &/lecting Science (11/ tbe Gmwld af
Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) for a Conti
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nental reading that takes Nietzsche's critique of tnlth straight to the task of
tracing its significance for articulating a philosophy of science worthy of the
name. See also, on more widely received and very solidly analytic grounds:
Maudemarie Clark, Niet:::..Jche 011 Truth and Phif."iOphy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and more broadly, Barry Allen, Tmth in PhiLodOphy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); as well as R. Lanier Anderson.
"Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism," ~~Vllthe.de 15 (1998): 1-32. See also
Anderson, "Nietzsche's Will to Power as a Doctrine of the Unity of Science,"
SludiM in HiAory alld PhiLNophy of Science 25, no. 5 (1995): 729--50; Ken Gemes,
"Nietzsche's Critique of Truth," PhiLlA'opby alld Phenllt1u!I1ological R,;.'Mrch 52, no.
I (March 1992): 47-65; Steven Hales and Rex Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, and
Nietzsche's Perspectivism," Hi.}tory of Phlio,'ophy Quarterly 11. no. I (1995):
101-19; Steven Schwartz, "The Status of Nietzsche's Theory of the Will to
Power in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy of Science," Ill/emallima}
Sludi!'•• in Phiia.'ophy 25, no. 2 (1993); and not including nonanalytic or historico
interpretive or Continental treatments. For a review of the Vienna Circle's orig
inal reception of Nietzsche, see Kurt Rudolf Fischer, "Nietzsche and the Vienna
Circle," in Nidz.'che, Theorie" oj Kno",I(;'~lJe and Critical Theory: Nietuche and the
SClence"I, ed. Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht, Ger.: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 119-28.
44. This includes Clark's influential study, NiefZ1che and Truth, as well as
the wide and growing range of contributions on the topical conjunction of
Nietzsche, truth, and epistemology by analytically formed younger scholars.
See Clark et a\., as noted above.
45. I have been emphasizing the relevance of the detail that Continental
philosophy is only so named in contrast to the Anglo.American or analytic
philosophical tradition (the name 'Continental' betrays its origin 'from' the
standpoint of the British Isle). Neither stylistic approach to philosophy is geo
graphically specific and, to be sure, analytic philosophy is far and away the
more universal approach to be found on any continent. Hence the program at
the most recent World Congress was not essentially other than any other con
gress such as the APA, with the exception of the ethnic diversity of the partic
ipants. This is, I suppose, what globalization in philosophy looks like.
46. Such newer analytic approaches to issues of Nietzsche and truth repre
sent an insulated complement to my own historically sensitive and interpretively
contextualized (or hermeneutic) approach to Niefzxh,';, PhilMophyo//)cience, aug
menting the separate but ineluctably historical tradition of European approaches
to Nietzsche's critical epistemology ranging from Vaihinger to Habermas.
47. Paradoxically, perhaps, this same institutional conviction means that
today's Continentally minded scholars, exactly unlike Nietzsche (indeed and
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very significantly, unlike Husserl or Heidegger), are almost universally mure
intereAcd in questions of popular ethics and politics (i.e., in telling people what

to do) than in issues of truth and lie or questions relating art and knowledge
or science and philosophy. In this direction, to note a Nietzschean reserve
against Levinas's foundational ethics, to invert the ordering principle preserves
the same distinction all over again.
48. Once again, we might note that Leiter invokes the analytic convention
of reducing philosophical kinds to the dilTerence between "good" or "quality"
and bad work in "Continental" philosophy, defining good Continental philos
ophy as that done by analytically trained scholars in analytic departments.
49. This is how it happens that practitioners of so-called Continental phi
losophy, which is at times named "contemporary European" philosophy, can be
as professionally marginalized in Europe (or on "the" continent) as in English
speaking countries. The kind of professional philosophy, as one's employed
European colleagues will tell one, as currently practiced (or better, aspired to)
on the continent is the kind to be found in Cambridge (on either side of the
Atlantic). Such marginalization has many causes, although perhaps the most
obvious derives from the rather universal scientism of our scientific techno
information era, which remains evident in the still unquestioned prestige oflog
ical and linguistic analytic approaches to philosophy and the growing impor.
tance of cognitive science in the same domain. For a discussion of the political
contours and stakes of this opposition, see my essay, "SokaI's Hermeneutic
Hoax: Physics and the New Inquisition," in Hcrment'ulil' Phil,,,,ophy of Science, Van
GO.'lh:, Eye", ano Guo: E'.JdY" in ]{(1fwr of Patrirk A. Heelan, S.J., ed. Babette E.
Babich (Dordrecht, Ger.: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 67-78.
50. It is not clear that Nietzsche, a man without an institutional affiliation,
could have published any books at all in today's market-driven publishing
world.
51. Thus Pierre Kerszberg writes. "Nietzsche certainly did not think that
he epitomized so well the whole of critical philosophy when he exclaimed 'Will
to truth. that might be a concealed will to death'" (Crill;/ufano Totality [Albany:
State University of ;>.jew York Press. 1997], p. 251). See also Daniel
Breazeale's comments in a lootnote to his introduction to his translation of
Nieluchc:;, Phil(),'''phy uno Truth, where he identifies the galvanizing concern of
Karl Schlechta's and Anni Anders's earlier reexamination of the edition of the
notes for ;>.jietzsche's Philu.J()phenbuch (Nict",xhe,1 U7crke, vol. 10. ed. Ernst Holzer
and August Horneffer. [Leipzig, Ger.: Kroner. 1907]. pp. 109-232; KSA 7:
417 IT.• and elsewhere), which they were able to unmask as an editorial attempt
to eliminate references to the issue of truth in favor of that of culture: "In par
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ticular. they [the earlier editors] had omitted many of the notes in which Niet
zsche poses most sharply the problem of the value of truth (which Schlechta
and Anders take to be the theme of these notes ...)" Breazeale. introduction to
Selectiothf from Niet:uched Noteboo/w of the Early 1870., (Atlantic Heights. N.J.:
Humanities Press. 1979). p. liv. Cf. Karl Schlechta and Anni Anders. Friedrirh
Niet:uche. Von den VerborgCllen An/all.'1en .leine.J Phi/odophieretl.1 (Stuttgart - Bad
Cannstatt: Frommann. 1982).
52. Sometimes this has unintentionally funny consequences. as in the
variety of so-called Prisoner's Dilemmas, none of which have any bit of real
life plausibility or can be reasoned (or indeed. make sense) apart from a course
in probability or logic. Contrast this with Sartre's much more coherent and less
forced discussion of the same quandary in his essay "The Wall."
53. This is why Nietzsche finds that, far from being opposed pursuits, sci.
ence and religion represent only variations upon the ascetic ideals of discipline
and renunciation. sobriety and progressive hope. Science is as jealous a god of
the tree of knowledge as the God of the Garden of the Old Testament, ergo
only science. or philosophy construed as a science (i.e., analytic philosophy of
science). gets to pass judgment on science. and its only judgment is approba
tion. See Paul Valadier's books. Niet::;'fche et III criJi.!,Je gil chriAI~llll;'me (Paris:
Cerf. 1974) and Niet::;"che. tath!e de r~'1i1ellr (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer. 1975)
as well as Valadier's "Science as the New Religion" in Nieb:;"ehe EpiAemol,~'1Y.
all(J Philo.lOph.lJ of SClellce. ed. Babette g. Babich, pp. 241-52. For a different
tack. see also the essays by Allen's "Forbidden Knowledge," "IoniA 79 (1996):
294-310 and Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker's chapter on Nietzsche in
JP'ahrnehmllllg ,Jer Neuzeit (Munich: Hanser, 1983). pp. 70-106. [ articulate this
genealogical account of the ascetic ideal in religion and science, see my chapter
"Nietzsche's Genealogy of Science: Morality and the Value of Modernity" in
Nief::;"c!"e;, Phi/o..rol'hy 0/ Science. pp. 175-225. as well as my review of the ulti
mate coincidence of postmodern (and associated putatively alternative) and
:'I[ew Age perspectives and the scientific ideal in HSokal's Hermeneutic Hoax."
54. After a kind of hermeneutic infusion. the interpretation-intoxicated
analyst is prepared to deal with a mobile army of metaphors. declaring it
nothing but sound and fury: so much epistemological dynamite, so little
danger. See Leiter's Web site (n. 39).
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